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COMMENT
Practice and Procedure: A Guide to Oklahoma's Offer of
Judgment Statutes

L Introduction
In civil litigation, the defendant should consider whether making an offer of
judgment to the plaintiff is in its best interest. An offer of judgment is a statutorily
created judgment where the defendant offers the plaintiff a judgment against it for a
specified amount.' An offer of judgment is essentially a settlement plus - a
settlement price, plus a judgment against the defendant This judgment has the same
effect and consequences of any court-rendered judgment!
Although an offer ofjudgment is akin to a normal settlement offer, it greatly differs
in effect and in procedure. The most often asked question is, "Why would an attorney
offer to have a judgment taken against her client when she can just offer to settle?"
The answer is that an offer of judgment has a cost-shifting effect when the plaintiff
rejects the offer and does not receive a greater judgment at trial. If the plaintiff rejects
the offer ofjudgment and the plaintiff obtains a judgment for less than the amount the
defendant offered, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's costs and in some cases
attorney fees from the time of the offer. Therefore, the plaintiff may be more likely
to accept an offer of judgment than a normal settlement offer, because the plaintiff
does not want to create the risk of having to pay for the defendant's costs. Many
considerations go into deciding whether a plaintiff should accept or reject a settlement
or an offer of judgment. The offer of judgment cost-shifting risk simply adds one
more incentive for the plaintiff to add to its list of reasons to accept.
Oklahoma has four statutes that govern offers of judgment;3 however, most
Oklahoma attorneys are reluctant to use them. One reason for such reluctance is that
the statutory language is ambiguous. The ambiguity has resulted in uncertainty as to
how to use the statutes and which statute to use. A second reason for attorneys'
reluctance to use the statutes is that Oklahoma courts have provided little
interpretation. This lack of judicial interpretation has also led to confusion as to how
attorneys should use the statutes. A third reason is that there is a lack of written
guidance beyond the statutes or cases. In fact, currently only two articles address
Oklahoma's offer of judgment statutes.! The goal of this comment is to provide

1. See 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 940, 1101, 1101.1, 1106 (1991 & Supp. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Charles W. Adams, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Law, 31 TULsA L. 753 (1996)

(documenting the changes of section 1101.1); Richard Eldridge, The Taxing ofAttorney Fees as Cost in
Actions for Injury to Property,51 OKLA. BJ. 2800 (1980) (discussing taxes paid on attorney fees under
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guidance to Oklahoma attorneys concerning offers ofjudgment. This guide is intended
to reduce the hesitation that Oklahoma attorney's associate with the offer of judgment
statutory procedure.
This comment also addresses three procedural problems that arise from the offer of
judgment statutes. First, which statute should an attorney use for her case? In
answering this question, this comment examines the exact language of each statute.
Since section 1101 was the first statute enacted and is the most commonly used of the
four, this comment analyzes it first. The remaining statutes are examined by
comparing their statutory language to the language of section 1101. As to each
statutory section, the comment explains the process of using the section, when to use
the section, and the effect of using the section.
The second problem this comment addresses is the proper procedure for making an
offer of judgment in multiple-plaintiff cases. Third, what is the procedure for making
an offer ofjudgment in multiple-defendant cases? Oklahoma courts have not answered
these questions. However, federal courts and other state courts have addressed these
problems under offer of judgment statutes that are substantially similar to title 12,
section 1101 of the Oklahoma Statutes.! Therefore, this comment refers to federal and
other states' decisions and rules to suggest how Oklahoma should address these issues.
Since section 1101 is the principal offer of judgment statute in Oklahoma, this
comment focuses on section 1101 when determining the procedure a lawyer should
use in multiple-plaintiff and multiple-defendant cases.
Part I of this comment introduces each of the four offer of judgment statutes and
discusses how to use each statue, the effect of each statute, and when to use each
statute. Part II presents other jurisdictions' treatment of offers ofjudgment in multipleplaintiff cases. Part ImI addresses the issue of how to make offers of judgment in
multiple-defendant cases through the use of other jurisdictions' case law. Part IV
explains why Oklahoma should and likely will follow the otherjurisdictions' treatment
of offers of judgment in multiple plaintiff and multiple defendant cases.
II. Which Statute Should an Attorney Use?
A. Section 1101

-

General Statute

1. Procedure
The Oklahoma legislature has left section 11016 unchanged since it originally

section 940).
5. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (Supp. 1999).

6.Id.
Offer to allow judgment to be taken
The defendant, in an action for the recovery of money only, may, at any time before
the trial, serve upon the plaintiff or his attorney an offer, in writing, to allow judgment
to be taken against him for the sum specified therein. If the plaintiff accept the offer and
give notice thereof to the defendant or his attorney, within five days after the offer was
served, the offer, and an affidavit that the notice of acceptance was delivered within the
time limited, may be filed by the plaintiff, or the defendant may file the acceptance, with
a copy of the offer, verified by affidavit; and in either case, the offer and acceptance shall
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enacted the statute in 1910.! Although Oklahoma officially adopted the statute in
1910, section 1101 has been a part of the Oklahoma laws since before statehood."
Nothing on record shows why the Oklahoma legislature decided to adopt this
particular statute In Dulan v. Johnston," however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated that the recognized purpose of Oklahoma's offer of judgment statute is to
promote settlement of civil litigation."
Section 1101 is entitled "Offer to Allow Judgment to Be Taken."'2 The statute

provides that the defendant may propose to the plaintiff that a judgment be entered
against the defendant for a specified amount." If the plaintiff accepts the offer and
gives notice to the defendant within five days, then the plaintiff or the defendant may
file the offer and acceptance with the court clerk." Upon filing, the clerk will enter
a judgment against the defendant obligating him to pay the plaintiff the amount
specified in the offer.' If the plaintiff does not accept the offer within five days, the
offer will be considered withdrawn. Neither party can use the offer as evidence in
the trial. 7 If the parties go to trial and the plaintiff obtains a judgment for less than
the defendant offered, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's costs from the time of the

offer."
Using the procedure incorrectly can result in adverse effects for the defendant who
is tendering an offer of judgment. In Bullard v. Grisham Construction Co.," the

Oklahoma Supreme Court outlined three minimum requirements that defendants must

be noted in the journal, and judgment shall be rendered accordingly. If the notice of
acceptance be not given in the period limited, the offer shall be deemed withdrawn, and
shall not be given in evidence or mentioned on the trial. If the plaintiff fails to obtain
judgment for more than was offered by the defendant, he shall pay the defendant's costs
from the time of the offer.
Id.
7. In Dulan v. Johnston, 687 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Okla. 1984), the court pointed out that the
Oklahoma legislature adopted section 1101 from a Kansas statute. It is interesting to note that the Kansas
Legislation has changed its statute four times. See 1963 Kan. Sess. Laws 60-2002 (amended by Supreme
Court order of July 17, 1969); 1974 Kan. Sess. Laws 4; 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws 2. Also, Oklahoma
adopted this statute from Kansas along with the remainder of the Oklahoma code of civil procedure. See
OKLA. STAT. § 4417 (1893).
8. See OKLA. STAT. § 4417 (1893).
9. Oklahoma does not have an official legislative history as the federal government does. Instead,
Oklahoma relies heavily on judicial interpretation. Having no legislative history becomes particularly
problematic in trial where the issue of the legislative intent is critical to construing a statute. Even
documents that purport to show legislative history are not official and, thus, the competency of such
evidence is unreliable.
10. 687 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Okla. 1984).
11.Id.at 1047.
12. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (Supp. 1999).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. lid.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 660 P.2d 1045 (Okla. 1983).
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meet in order to recover costs:' First, the defendant must make a formal offer of
judgment.2 Second, the offer must be in writing with a copy served on the opposing
counsel. Third, the plaintiff must have five days to accept or reject the offer." The
court did not explain the above requirements, but stated only that these three are the
minimum requirements.
2. When To Use Section 1101
The statute states that defendants can use the settlement "plus" procedure in an
action for the recovery of money only. In Seitsinger v. Dockum Pontiac, Inc.,4 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held section 1101 inapplicable because the plaintiff sought
remedies other than monetary damages.' The plaintiff sued seeking recision of a
contract, or in the alternative, damages for breach of warranty.' Recision is an
equitable remedy and damages are legal remedies.' The defendant made an offer of
judgment to the plaintiff, but the opinion did not reveal the specifics of the offer of
judgment.' After the court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, the defendants moved for costs pursuant to section 1101. r' The trial court
granted costs to defendants and the plaintiff appealed."
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that section 1101 applies to actions only for
monetary damages, thus it did not apply because the plaintiffs petition sought
equitable relief and monetary damages." The court agreed, citing Blackwell, E. &
S. W. Railway. Co. v. Bebou 2 for support. In Blackwell, the court ruled that the offer
of judgment statute did not apply because the plaintiff sought both legal and equitable
remedies.33 Based on the language of the statute and the Supreme Court's ruling, an
attorney can clearly use section 1101 in any action seeking solely monetary damages,
but not in an action seeking equitable relief or in an action seeking both monetary
damages and equitable relief.

20. Id. at 1047.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In Bullard, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not allow the defendant to recover costs
because the defendant failed to comply with the minimum requirements of section 101. However, the
court did not indicate which of the three requirements the defendant failed to meet or how the defendant
failed to meet the requirements.
24. 894 P.2d 1077 (Okla. 1995).
25. Id. at 1082.
26. Id. at 1078.
27. Id. at 1082.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1081.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1082.
32. 91 P. 877 (Okla. 1907).
33. Id. at 882. In Blackwell, the court determined the applicability of section 1101's predecessor,
OKLA. STAT. § 4715 (1903). The wording of the two statutes is identical.
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3. Cost, Interest, and Attorney Fees
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bullard v. Grisham Construction Co.,' stated
that the word "costs" in section 1101 does not include attorney fees unless the
underlying cause of action permits an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party.
If the plaintiff accepts the offer of judgment, it is considered the prevailing partys
If the plaintiff rejects the offer of judgment and subsequently recovers a judgment for
less than the offer of judgment, the plaintiff is still the prevailing party for purposes
of recovering attorney fees.'
In the latter instance, however, the plaintiff may recover only those attorney fees
it incurred up to the date of the offer and the defendant is entitled to recover the
attorney fees it incurred after the date of the offer. Precluding the defendant from
recovering attorney fees incurred before the offer of judgment promotes the purpose
of the offer of judgment statute, which is to encourage settlement. For example, if the
plaintiff rejects the offer, it takes the risk that it may recover less at trial and will be
responsible for defendant's attorney fees after the date of the offer. An attorney
making an offer of judgment should consider this rule when deciding when to make
an offer of judgment. The attorney should tender the offer ofjudgment as soon as she
has enough information to make a well calculated offer, in order to recover the
greatest possible fees.
An attorney must explicitly provide in the offer ofjudgment what is included in the
offer amount because silence indicates that the offer does not include anything but
damages.3 If the plaintiff accepts a nonspecifying offer, then the plaintiff can move
for prejudgment interest per section 727(E),' attorney fees per section 936"9 or
section 940(A), and/or costs allowed to the prevailing party per sections 928 and
929. 4' Therefore, the defendant may have to pay the offer of judgment amount plus
prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and/or costs. However, the defendant can avoid
being subjected to the extra payment by explicitly stating that the offer of judgment
includes prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. If the defendant intends to
include attorney fees and costs in the offer, then her attorney must explicitly write this
intention into the offer.42
Case law illustrates the importance of stating that the offer of judgment sum
includes all costs, interest, and attorney fees. For example, in Allison v. City of El
Reno,"3 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals granted the plaintiff attorney fees pursuant

34. 660 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Okla. 1983).
35. Wieland v. Danner Auto Supply, Inc., 695 P.2d 1332, 1333-34 (Okla. 1984).
36. Van Cleave v. Kolpak Builders Co., 693 P.2d 17, 19 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Falkner v.
Thompson, 585 P.2d 403, 407 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
37. Allison v. City of El Reno, 894 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
38. 12 OKIA. STAT. § 727(E) (Supp. 1999).
39. Id. § 936.
40. kd § 940(A).
41. Id. §§ 928-929.
42. Allison, 894 P.2d at 1135.
43, Id. at 1134-35.
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to section 940(A)" after the plaintiff accepted the defendant's offer of judgment. 5
The court stated, "[T]he written offer was silent as to attorney fees and costs. Thus,
the simple and unambiguous language of the... [defendant's] written offer clearly
shows that attorney fees and cost were not included within the proffered judgment."'
The court reasoned that the defendant could have included attorney fees as part of the
offer of judgment amount, but it did not do so." Therefore, the court concluded that
the defendant had to pay attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 940(A), in
addition to the amount of the offer of judgment.4 The defendants could have
eliminated this problem by writing the offer of judgment to reflect the intention of
including attorney fees and costs, such as: "The defendant offers judgment to be taken
against it in the amount of $2,000, including costs, interest, and attorney fees." Thus,
an attorney should include the language "including costs, interest, and attorney fees,"
if it is the offeror's intent that such items be included in the offer.
A similar problem is illustrated in Bohnefeld v. Haney 9 In Bohnefeld, the plaintiff
sued for personal injuries.' The defendant made an offer of judgment in the amount
of $2000."' The plaintiff rejected the offer and the parties proceeded to trial. 2 The
jury entered a verdict for the plaintiff for $1911.75." The judgment rendered after
adding prejudgment interest was $2234.38. The plaintiff contended that the amounts
to be compared are the offer of judgment ($2000) and the court's judgment
($2234.38)." Thus, the plaintiff argued that the defendant was not entitled to costs
because the judgment amount was more than the offer of judgment.' The defendant
contended that it was entitled to costs because the offer of judgment ($2000) did not

44. Section 940(A) provides for attorney fees in negligent and willful damage to property cases. 12
OKLA. STAT. § 940(A) (1991). However, section 940(B) bars the plaintiff from receiving the attorney
fees that section 940(A) provides when a plaintiff rejects an offer ofjudgment and subsequently recovers
a judgment for less than the amount of the offer. For further explanation of section 940(B), see
discussion supra Part II.B. In addition, the offer of judgment made in Allison was made pursuant to
section 1101 because it was brought under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151
through 172. The tort that the plaintiff was suing for was willful and negligent damage to property.
However, this does not change the rule stated in Evans v. Sitton, 735 P.2d 334 (Okla. 1987), that offers
of judgment made pursuant to willful and negligent damage to property must he made under section

940(B).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Allison, 894 P.2d at 1135.
Id.
d.
Id.
931 P.2d 90 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 91.

51. Id. at 9O.
52. Idl.

53. Id.at91.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss1/13
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include interestO Thus, the court should compare the offer of judgment with the bare
verdict ($1911.75) and award the defendant costs5
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff.' It examined the
legislative intent and concluded that the legislature meant judgment, not verdict, when
it said 'judgment" in section 1101 Further, in section 727(A)(2), the legislature
distinguished a verdict from a judgment 6 Section 727(A)(2) states that "when a
verdict for damages by reason of personal injuries.., is accepted by the trial court,
the court in rendering judgment shall add interest on said verdict .. 6 Based on
this language, the Bohnefeld court reasoned that if the legislature "had intended a
section 1101 offer to be compared to a verdict, rather than to a judgment, it would
have so stated."' The court concluded that the legislature knew and contemplated
that a judgment would include prejudgment interest.' Thus, the court should compare
the offer ofjudgment to the judgment that includes interest in determining whether the
defendant is entitled to costs under section 1101 The defendant, then, was not
awarded costs pursuant to section 1101 because the offer of judgment ($2000) was
less than the judgment ($2234.38).' The Bohnefeld case illustrates the importance
of estimating the prejudgment interest when calculating the amount of the offer of
judgment.
B. Section 940(B) PropertyAction

Offer of Judgmentfor Negligent or Willful Injury to

1. Procedure
Section 940(B) 67 is similar to section 1101 but applies only to negligent or willful

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 727(A)(2) (1991); see also Bohnefeld, 931 P.2d at 91 (discussing the

distinction between verdict and judgments as described by the legislature).
62. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 727(A)(2) (1991).
63. Hohnefeld, 931 P.2d at 91.
64. ld.
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 940(B) (1991).
Negligent or willful injury to property - Attorney fees and costs - Offer and
acceptance of judgment
A. In any civil action to recover damages for the negligent or willful injury to property
and any other incidental costs related to such action, the prevailing party shall be allowed
reasonable attorney's fees, court costs and interest to be set by the court and to be taxed
and collected as other costs of the action.
B. Provided that, the defendant in such action may, not less than ten (10) days after
being served with summons, serve upon the plaintiff or his attorney a written offer to
allow judgment to be taken against him. If the plaintiff accepts the offer and gives notice
thereof to the defendant or his attorney, within five (5) days after the offer was served,
the offer, and an affidavit that the notice of acceptance was delivered within the time
limited, may be filed by the plaintiff, or the defendant, verified by affidavit. The offer and
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injury to property actions. The procedure of section 940(B) is essentially the same as
the procedure for a section 1101 offer ofjudgment. However, two differences between
section 1101 and section 940 arise. The first difference is one of procedure. A
defendant using section 94003) must wait ten days after the plaintiff serves a
summons before the defendant can make an offer ofjudgment. The second difference,
discussed below, relates to recovery of attorney fees and interest.
2. When To Use Section 940(B)
A defendant can use section 940(B) "in any civil action to recover damages for the
negligent or willful injury to property and any other incidental costs related to such
action."' However, Evans v. Sitton6 indicates that an attorney may not use section
1101 where the attorney can use a section 940(B) offer of judgment.' Further,
according to Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., section 940
applies to claims only for physical injury to tangible property.' The Oklahoma courts
have held section 940 inapplicable to a slander of title claim7 a protection of trade
secrets claim, 4 and a conversion of hydrocarbons claim.7 Oklahoma courts have
clearly indicated that attorneys can use section 940(B) only for the recovery of direct
and incidental damages incurred from negligent or willful injury to property.
3. Attorney Fees, Costs & Interest
As stated above, section 1101 and section 94003) are essentially the same, but differ
in procedure discussed above, and in the effect and use of attorney fees. Section 1101

acceptance shall be noted in the journal, and judgment shall be rendered accordingly. If
the notice of acceptance is not given in the period limited, the offer shall be deemed
withdrawn, and shall not be given in evidence or mentioned at the trial. If upon the action
being adjudicated the judgment rendered is for the defendant or for the plaintiff and is for
a lesser amount than the defendant's offer, then the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover
attorney's fees, court costs and interest. If the judgment rendered is for the plaintiff, and
is for the same amount as the defendant's offer, then the plaintiff and defendant shall incur
their own attorney's fees, court costs and interest. And if the judgment rendered is for the
plaintiff, and is for a larger amount than the defendant's offer, then the plaintiff shall be
entitled to recover attorney's fees, court costs and interest.
Id.
68. Id.
69. 735 P.2d 334 (Okla. 1987).
70. Id.at 336; see also Eldridge, supranote 4, at 2801 (concluding that section 1101 should never
be utilized in any civil action to recover damages for negligent or willful injury to property, since such
actions are within the exclusive purview of section 940). Eldridge's conclusion began with the premise
that special statutes prevail over general statutes, citing Golver ConstructionCo. v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 554
(10th Cir. 1979), and Biedleman v. Belford, 525 P.2d 649 (Okla.1974). Id.
71. 700 P.2d 1011 (Okla. 1984).
72. Id. at 1013.
73. Turner Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Stapleton, 872 P.2d 926, 927 (Okla. 1994).
74. ABC Coating Co., Inc. v. J.Harris & Sons Ltd., 743 P.2d 271, 273-74 (Okla. 1987) (holding
trade secrets not to be property within the meaning of section 940). ABC Coating did not specifically
address offers of judgment pursuant to section 940(B), but instead discussed section 940(A). However,
the meaning of property for section 940(A) also applies to section 940(B).
75. Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Wishbone Oil & Gas, Inc., 746 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
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allows a defendant's post-offer costs to shift to the plaintiff if the plaintiff rejects the
offer and receives a judgment for less than the amount offered. Under section 940(B),
however, a defendant's post-offer costs do not shift to the plaintiff; section 940(B) just
prevents the plaintiff from recovering post-offer costs and attorney fees from the
defendant! 6 The Oklahoma Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation in Evans v.
Sitton.n In Evans, the court explicitly held that "[plaragraph B of § 940 is merely
a bar to recovery of fees and costs by the plaintiff who would otherwise be entitled
to them."'
According to this interpretation, the statute provides three possible outcomes
pursuant to offer of judgment.' First, section 940(B) states that if the judgment is
for the plaintiff and is for an amount larger than the defendant's offer, then the
plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees, court costs, and interest.' Second, section
940(B) states that if the judgment rendered at trial is for the plaintiff or the defendant
and the judgment is for a lesser amount,then the plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees,
court costs, or interest."' Third, section 940(B) specifies that if the judgment rendered
is for the same amount as the defendant's offer, then the parties will pay their own
attorney fees, court costs, and interest.'
Unlike section 1101, an attorney using section 940 may not want to include the
phrase "including attorney fees, costs, and interest." In Carson v. Specialized
Concrete, Inc.,83 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a trial court must consider
[the] amount of [the] costs and attorney fees when determining if a jury verdict is
lesser or greater than [the] amount of [an] offer that includes costs and attorney
fees." In Carson, the defendant made a section 940(B) offer of judgment "in the
amount of $675.00 inclusive of all interest, costs and attorney fees." 5 The plaintiff
rejected the offer and the jury awarded the plaintiff $639.35 in damages.' The
plaintiffs moved for attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest in the amount of
$1187.72 pursuant to 940(A).'
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion because the judgment ($639.75) was less
than the offer of judgment ($675.00). The appeals court reversed and awarded
plaintiffs attorney fees, costs, and interest under section 940(B). The Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' ruling. The defendant argued that the court should
compare the offer ofjudgment, which includes attorney fees, costs, and interest, to the
amount of the judgment to determine whether the plaintiff should recover attorney fees

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

For a good discussion of section 940, see Eldridge, supra note 4.
735 P.2d 334 (Okla. 1987).
Id. at 336.
Id. (explaining the three situations in which section 940(B) should be used).
12 OKLA. STAT. § 940(B) (1991).
Id.
Id.
801 P.2d 691 (Okla. 1990).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.
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and costs under section 940(B). The court found that under the defendant's
interpretation, "a defendant can thwart the legislative intent of section 940 by offering
an amount that is more than the amount claimed but less than the recovery plus the
total taxable court cost."U The court reasoned that the legislature did not intend for
this type of loophole to exist." Thus, the court awarded the plaintiff attorney fees and
costs under section 940(B) because the judgment plus attorney fees and costs
($1827.07) was more than the offer of judgment inclusive of the attorney fees, costs,
and interest ($675.00).
After Carson, attorneys have two options when making offers ofjudgment pursuant
to section 940(B). First, the attorney may make an offer of judgment with the phrase
"including attorney fees, costs, and interest." The effect of including the phrase is best
illustrated by example. The defendant makes an offer of judgment pursuant to section
940(B) for $10,000 including costs and attorney fees and the plaintiff rejects the offer.
At trial, the jury renders a verdict for plaintiff for $5000. The plaintiff, then, moves
for costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 940(A) and subsequently recovers an
additional $6000. The defendant appeals the award of $6000 for costs and fees
because the plaintiff received less at trial ($5000) than the offer of judgment amount
($10,000). Under section 1101, the defendant would win the appeal. However,
according to the court in Carson, the defendant will not prevail under section 940(B).
Instead, the court will compare the offer of judgment amount ($10,000) to the jury
verdict ($5000) plus the costs and fees ($6000). Thus, the total judgment with costs
and fees ($11,000) is more than the offer of judgment ($10,000). In this situation, the
court would likely render attorney fees and costs to plaintiff. An attorney can reduce
the risk of this outcome by carefully calculating the offer of judgment to reflect the
likely verdict plus the reasonable attorney fees, costs, and interest. Therefore, when
the court insists upon comparing the offer of judgment with the damage award plus
fees, costs, and interest, the offer of judgment will have a better chance of prevailing.
Unlike section 1101, an attorney using section 940 may choose to draft the offer
of judgment without the phrase "including attorney fees, costs, and interest." The
likely effect of excluding such a phrase is that a court will compare the judgment
amount disregarding attorney fees, costs, and interest to an offer ofjudgment amount
that is silent to fees, costs, and interest. A court should interpret the statute so as to
always require considering attorney fees, costs, and interest when determining the
applicability of section 940(B), as did the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bohnefeld in
interpreting section 1101. However, this interpretation would seem inconsistent with
the reasoning of Carson, which states that because the offer of judgment includes
attorney fees, costs, and interest, it should be compared to the same. Conversely,
then, a court could apply Carson's reasoning to hold that an offer exclusive of
attorney fees, costs, and interest must be compared to the damage award excluding
the calculation of the attorney fees, costs, and interest.

88. Id. at 693.
89. Id.
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C. Section 1106 - PartialOffer of Judgment
1. Procedure
Section 1106'9 is an offer of judgment statute that provides for a partial offer of
judgment. The procedure is the same for section 1106 as it is for section 1101, except
section 1106 provides that the defendant in an action for the recovery of money may
offer a judgment to confess "for part of the money claimed or part of the causes
involved in the claim."'" The statute states that if a plaintiff rejects the offer and the
plaintiff does not recover more than the defendant's offer of judgment at trial, then the
plaintiff must pay all of the defendant's post-offer costs.
2. When to Use Section 1106
Since 1941, only one case has cited section 1106." That case discussed only when
attorney fees are recoverable.' Therefore, no case law illustrates when an attorney
can use section 1106. However, based on the language of the statute, it is fairly clear
that a defendant may use section 1106 any time it may use section 1101, namely
where the plaintiff claims monetary damages only. The difference between sections
1106 and 1101 is that section 1106 provides a mechanism for use when the defendant
does not want to make an offer of judgment for the entire amount of damages or for
all claims brought against it. For example, if the plaintiff sues the defendant for false
imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant could offer
judgment to be taken against it for the false imprisonment claim only. If the defendant
felt that the plaintiff had a weak or frivolous claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, then it may want to proceed to litigate that claim while offering a
judgment for the false imprisonment claim. Section 1106 creates this possibility for
the defendant.
In addition to the possibility of making an offer of judgment for only one cause of
action, the statute allows the defendant to make an offer of judgment for part of the
monetary damages claimed. For example, the plaintiff may seek recovery of past and
future medical expenses. Section 1106 allows the defendant to make an offer of

90. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1106 (1991).
Offer to confess judgment in part.
After an action for the recovery of money is brought, the defendant may offer in court
to confess judgment for part of the amount claimed, or part of the causes involved in the
action; whereupon, if the plaintiff, being present, refuse to accept such confession of
judgment in full of his demands against the defendant in the action, or, having had such
notice that the offer would be made, of its amount, and of the time of making it, as the
court shall deem reasonable, fail to attend, and on the trial do not recover more than was
so offered to be confessed, such plaintiff shall pay all the costs of the defendant incurred
after the offer. The offer shall not be deemed to be an admission of the cause of action,
or the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, nor be given in evidence upon the trial.
Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Bullard v. Grisham Constr. Co., 660 P.2d 1045 (Okla. 1983).
Id at 1047.
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judgment for the past medical expenses and proceed to trial on the recovery of the
future medical expenses.
In determining whether to use section 1106, a defendant may be wary that the mere
fact of an offer of judgment for one cause of action or for part of the money damages
would increase the plaintiffs chance of recovery on the remaining cause of action.
This fear of increasing the plaintiffs chance of recovery is created because the
defendant thinks that by allowing a judgment to be entered against it on one claim,
it is admitting liability in the entire action. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Johnson
v. Gaines," attempting to curtail this fear, held that a plaintiff may not introduce
evidence of a section 1106 offer of judgment at trial.' Further, the Court held that
a judge instructing the jury as to the existence of the offer of judgment constitutes
prejudicial error. 7 Moreover, the last line of the statute states, "[t]he offer of
judgment shall not be deemed to be an admission of the cause of action, or the
amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, nor be given in evidence upon the trial.""'
Therefore, using 1106 instead of 1101 is fairly safe in any circumstance where the
defendant only wants to settle part of the plaintiffs claims by way of an offer of
judgment.
3. Attorney Fees, Costs, and Interest
Just as section 1106 is similar to section 1101 procedurally, it is also similar to
section 1101 in terms of attorney fees, costs, and interest. In Bullard v. Grisham
Construction Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that section 1106 does not
include attorney fees unless the underlying cause of action allows for the award of
attorney fees to the prevailing party." Bullard is the only case that addresses attorney
fees under section 1106. However, because the court treats section 1106 in the same
manner as section 1101 in every other respect, it is reasonable to believe that the same
rules regarding attorney fees, costs, and interest under section 1101 are applicable to
section 1106 offers of judgments as well.
The statute is not clear as to the effect of costs if the plaintiff rejects the defendant's
offer of judgment and does not receive a judgment for more than the offer. The
statute states that if a plaintiff rejects the offer and at trial does not recover more than
the defendant offered, "such plaintiff shall pay all the costs of the defendant incurred
after the offer.""Iw A court could interpret this language to mean that if the defendant
offers to confess judgment in part and the plaintiff rejects, then the plaintiff could be
subjected to paying all of the defendants' costs on all causes of action, rather than
paying costs only on the cause of action for which the offer of judgment was made.
Although at first glance it does not seem fair, two reasons explain why the court may
adopt this interpretation.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

96 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1939).
Id. at 69.
Id.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 1106 (1991).
660 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Okla. 1983).
12 OKLA. STAT. § 1106 (1991).
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First, the language in the statute states that after the plaintiff rejects the partial offer
of judgment and then recovers less than the offer of judgment, the "plaintiff shall pay
all costs of the defendant incurred after the offer.""' The legislature did not
differentiate between the costs incurred for the cause of action that the defendant
attempted to settle and the cause of action that the defendant did not attempt to settle.
Thus, a court could conclude that the legislature intended to award all costs to the
defendant in the above situation. Second, it may be very difficult to track costs and
attorney fees incurred on solely one cause of action; and it may be impossible to track
costs and attorney fees incurred on a portion of the damages. The legislature may
have foreseen this dilemma when drafting the statute, thus electing to award defendant
all costs incurred from the time of the offer of judgment. In sum, the effect of section
1106 creates many technical difficulties, which is likely why it is not used often.
Another problem that arises under section 1106 is that neither the statute nor the
case law indicates what amount the court will compare to the partial offer of
judgment. To determine whether a defendant is entitled to costs, courts could compare
the amount of the offer of judgment to either the judgment on only the causes of
action for which the defendant tendered the offer ofjudgment, or the judgment on all
the causes of actions. For example, assume a plaintiff sues for emotional distress and
false imprisonment. The defendant tenders an offer of judgment for the emotional
distress claim in the amount of $5000 and the plaintiff rejects the offer. At trial, the
jury awards $3000 for emotional distress and $3000 for false imprisonment, a total
judgment of $6000. The defendant moves for costs under section 1106 contending that
the damages award for the emotional distress ($3000) was less than the offer of
judgment ($5000). It is unclear whether the defendant will prevail or whether a court
will compare the total judgment for emotional distress and false imprisonment ($6000)
to the partial offer of judgment ($5000). If a court chooses the latter, the defendant
will not be entitled to costs under this example.
The latter decision, however, may be unlikely because of Oklahoma's use of general
verdicts. In Oklahoma, a general verdict is ordinarily used. A general verdict is a
verdict on all claims - either for the plaintiff or for the defendant." Therefore, the
jury would not make an award separating the emotional distress and false imprisonment claims. Instead, the jury would award a single sum, not indicating whether the
award was partly for each cause of action or for only one. Consequently, an attorney
should request that the judge issue a special verdict, in which the jury is required to
award damages separately with respect to each claim or each item of damages. 3
Due to the myriad of problems created under section 1106, a defendant should
consider using the partial offer of judgment only when it wants to eliminate a cause
of action or a type of damages. If the plaintiff accepts the partial offer of judgment,
then the defendant's mission was accomplished. If the plaintiff rejects the offer of
judgment, then the defendant's desires will not have been fulfilled and the effects of

101. d. (emphasis added).
102. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 587 (Supp. 2000).
103. Id.
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section 1106 are virtually useless. Thus, the defendant should consider making a
section 1101 offer of judgment, if its section 1106 offer of judgment is rejected.
D. Section 1101.1 - New Offer of Judgment Statute
1. Procedure
The Oklahoma Legislature recently enacted section 1101. 1" pursuant to the Tort
104. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1101.1 (Supp. 1999).
Civil actions - Offers of judgment - Counteroffers - Recovery of costs and
attorneys fees
A. Actions for personal injury, wrongful death, and certain specified actions.
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this subsection, after a civil action is
brought for the recovery of money as the result of a claim for personal injury, wrongful
death, or pursuant to Chapter 21 of Title 25 or Section 5 of Title 85 of the Oklahoma
Statutes, any defendant may file with the court, at any time more than ten (10) days prior
to trial, an offer of judgment for a sum certain to any plaintiff with respect to the action
or any claim or claims asserted in the action. An offer of judgment shall be deemed to
include any costs or attorneys fees otherwise recoverable. If an offer of judgment is filed,
each plaintiff to whom an offer ofjudgment is made shall, within ten (10) days, file:
a. a written acceptance or rejection of such offer, or
b. a counteroffer of judgment, as described in paragraph 2 of this subsection
If the plaintiff fails to file a timely response, the offer of judgment shall be deemed
rejected. The fact an offer of judgment is made but not accepted or is deemed rejected
does not preclude subsequent timely offers of judgment.
2. In the event a defendant files an offer of judgment, the plaintiff may, within ten (10)
days, file with the court a counteroffer of judgment directed to each defendant who has
filed an offer ofjudgment. If a counteroffer ofjudgment is filed, each defendant to whom
the counteroffer ofjudgment is made shall, within ten (10) days, file a written acceptance
or rejection of the counteroffer ofjudgment. If a defendant fails to file a timely response,
the counteroffer of judgment shall be deemed rejected. The fact a counteroffer of
judgment is made but not accepted or deemed rejected does not preclude subsequent
counteroffers of judgment if subsequent offers of judgment are made.
3. In the event the plaintiff rejects the offer(s) of judgment and the judgment awarded
the plaintiff, exclusive of any costs or attorneys fees otherwise recoverable, is less than
the final offer of judgment, then the defendant filing the offer of judgment shall be
entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by
that defendant from the date of filing of the final offer of judgment until the date of the
verdict. Such costs and fees may be offset from the judgment entered against the offering
defendant; provided, however, that prior to any such offset, the plaintiffs attorney may:
a. exercise any attorneys lien claimed in an amount not to exceed twenty-five percent
(25%) of the judgment, and
b. recover the plaintiffs reasonable litigation costs, not to exceed an additional fifteen
percent (15%) of the judgment or Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), whichever is
greater.
4. In the event a defendant rejects the counteroffer(s) of judgment and the judgment
awarded to the plaintiff is greater than the final counteroffer of judgment, the plaintiff
shall be entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees
incurred by the plaintiff from the date of filing ofthe final counteroffer ofjudgment until
the date of the verdict. Such costs and fees may be added to the judgment entered in favor
of the plaintiff.
5. The provisions of this subsection shall apply only where the plaintiff demands in a
pleading orin trial proceedings more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00),
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or where the defendant makes an offer of judgment more than One Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($100,000.00). Any offer of judgment may precede the demand.
B. Other actions.
1. After a civil action is brought for the recovery of money or property in an action
other than for personal injury, wrongful death or pursuant to Chapter 21 of Title 25 or
Section 5 of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes, any defendant may file with the court, at
any time more than ten (10) days prior to trial, an offer of judgment for a sum certain to
any plaintiff with respect to the action or any claim or claims asserted in the action. An
offer of judgment shall not be deemed to include any costs and attorneys fees otherwise
recoverable. If an offer of judgment is filed, the plaintiff or plaintiffs to whom the offer
of judgment is made shall, within ten (10) days, file:
a. a written acceptance or rejection of the offer, or
b. a counteroffer of judgment, as described in paragraph 2 of this subsection.
If a plaintiff fails to file a timely response, the offer of judgment shall be deemed
rejected. The fact an offer of judgment is made but not accepted or is deemed rejected
does not preclude subsequent timely offers of judgment.
2. In the event a defendant files an offer ofjudgment, the plaintiff may, within ten (10)
days, file with the court a counteroffer of judgment to each defendant who has filed an
offer of judgment and the claim or claims which are the subject thereof. If a counteroffer
of judgment is filed, each defendant to whom a counteroffer of judgment is made shall,
within ten (10) days, file a written acceptance or rejection of the counteroffer ofjudgment.
If a defendant fails to file a timely response, the counteroffer ofjudgment shall be deemed
rejected. The fact a counteroffer of judgment is made but not accepted or is deemed
rejected does not preclude subsequent counteroffers of judgment if subsequent offers of
judgment are made.
3. If no offer of judgment or counteroffer of judgment is accepted and the judgment
awarded the plaintiff, exclusive of any costs or attorneys fees otherwise recoverable, is
less than one or more offers of judgment, the defendant shall be entitled to reasonable
litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the defendant with respect to the
action or the claim or claims included in the offer of judgment from and after the date of
the first offer of judgment which is greater than the judgment until the date of the
judgment. Such costs and fees may be offset from the judgment entered against the
offering defendant.
4. If no offer of judgment or counteroffer of judgment is accepted and the judgment
awarded the plaintiff, exclusive of any costs or attorneys fees otherwise recoverable, is
greater than one or more counteroffers of judgment, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
recover the reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the
plaintiff with respect to the action or the claim or claims included in the counteroffer of
judgment from and after the date of the first counteroffer of judgment which is less than
the judgment until the date of the judgment. Such costs and fees may be added to the
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff.
5. An award of reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees under
paragraph 3 of this subsection shall not preclude an award under paragraph 4 of this
subsection, and an award under paragraph 4 of this subsection shall not preclude an award
under paragraph 3 of this subsection.
6. This subsection shall not apply to actions brought pursuant to Chapter 21 of Title
25 or Section 5 of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
C. Evidence of an offer of judgment or a counteroffer of judgment shall not be
admissible in any action or proceeding for any purpose except in proceedings to enforce
a settlement arising out of an offer of judgment or counteroffer of judgment or to
determine reasonable attorneys fees and reasonable litigation costs under this section.
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Reform Law." Section 1101.1 is a new offer of judgment provision that allows
plaintiffs to counteroffer. Three similarities arise between section 1101 and 1101.1.
First, the defendant is the only party that may initiate the procedure.'" Second, if the
plaintiff rejects the offer and subsequently recovers a judgment for less than the offer
made, then the defendant will be entitled to certain post-offer expenses.'" Third, if
the plaintiff rejects the offer, neither party can use the offer as evidence in the
5
trial.1
Though the statutes may have some similarities, differences abound. First, section
1101.1 allows the defendant to recover his attorney fees and costs if the plaintiff
recovers a judgment for less than the amount of the offer, even if the underlying
causes of action are not claims upon which attorney fees are otherwise recoverable. "
Under section 1101, a defendant is only entitled to recover costs when the underlying
cause of action is one in which the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney
fees."' Second, under section 1101.1, a plaintiff may make a counteroffer to the
defendant's offer of judgment. If the defendant does not accept the counteroffer, then
the defendant may be liable for the plaintiffs attorney fees.' Therefore, by making
a section 1101.1 offer of judgment, the defendant may endanger itself by creating
more liability than it would have originally incurred. Third, under section 1101.1, the
plaintiff has ten days, rather than five days, to make a counteroffer, a rejection, or an
acceptance. Fourth, section 1101.1 differentiates between different kinds of actions.
Subsection A of 1101.1 is concerned only with personal injury, wrongful death,
discrimination, and retaliatory discharge actions while subsection B of 1101.1 covers
all other types of actions.
2. When To Use Section 1101.1
The main difference between section 1101 and section 1101.1 is when attorneys
may use section 1101.1. Subsection A of 1101.1 limits the use of the offer of
judgment to actions involving any personal injury, wrongful death, discrimination, and

D. This section shall apply whether or not litigation costs or attorneys fees are
otherwise recoverable.
E. The provisions of this section are severable, and if any part or provision thereof
shall be held void, the decision of the court shall not affect or impair any of the remaining
parts or provisions thereof.
F. This section shall apply to all civil actions filed after the effective date of this act.
Id.

105. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287 (amended 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287). For a discussion of the Tort
Reform Act and section 1101, see Charles W. Adams, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Law - Civil
Procedure, 31 TULSA LJ. 753, 754 (1996).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Adams, supra note 105, at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 756.
Id.
See discussion infra Part I.A.3.

111. Id.
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retaliatory discharge. The plaintiff must seek monetary damages in excess of $100,000
or the offer must be for more than $100,000."'
Under section 1101.1(B), a defendant can use section 1101.1 for any civil action
"brought for the recovery of money or property in an action other than" personal
injury, wrongful death, discrimination and retaliatory discharge."' Under section
1101, a defendant can make an offer of judgment in actions seeking money only.
Therefore, under section 1101.1, a defendant can make an offer of judgment for the
recovery of property, while under section 1101, it can only tender an offer of
judgment for the recovery of money.
3. Attorney Fees, Costs, and Interest
As originally enacted, section 1101.1 deemed any costs or attorney fees as included
in the offer of judgment. Under this version of the statute, an attorney would not have
to include the phrase "including attorney fees and costs," as she would under section
1101. However, in 1999, the legislature omitted the phrase in section 1101.1(B) that
deemed attorney fees and costs included." 4 Thus, when making an offer of judgment
under section 1101.103), the attorney may have to include the phrase "including
attorney fees and costs" to prevent the plaintiff from moving for such after accepting
the offer of judgment." 5
Additionally, under section 1101.1 the legislature has provided that the court shall
compare the offer of judgment amount to the judgment amount minus attorney fees
or costs."6 The statute does not leave the question open for judicial interpretation as
does section 1101. However, section 1101.1 is silent as to prejudgment interest.
Accordingly, the court may add the prejudgment interest to the jury verdict before
comparing the offer of judgment amount to the court's judgment amount. Thus,
attorneys should calculate prejudgment interest into the amount of offers of judgment
made pursuant to section 1101.1.
The most important distinction between section 1101.1 and the other offer of
judgment statutes is the possibility of either party recovering attorney fees where
attorney fees otherwise would not be recoverable. Under section 1101.1, a plaintiff
will have to pay attorney fees if it rejects the defendant's offer and receives a
judgment for less than the defendant's offer. Likewise, if the defendant does not
accept the plaintiffs counter-offer, and the plaintiff receives more than it offered, then
the defendant must pay the plaintiffs attorney fees, regardless of whether the
underlying cause of action allows for attorney fees. Therefore, the greatest risk to a
defendant making an offer ofjudgment under section 1101.1 is that the defendant may
be required to pay the plaintiffs attorney fees in a case where the plaintiff would not
usually be entitled to fees. On the other hand, if a defendant is confident that its offer

112. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1101.1(A)(5) (Supp. 1999).
113. Id. § I101.1(B) (emphasis added).
114. 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 293.
115. Note that the legislature did not omit the phrase that deemed attorney fees and costs included
in section 1101.1(A), which applies toany personal injury, wrongful death, discrimination and retaliatory
discharge actions. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1101.1(B).
116. Ld.
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is in an amount greater than the potential judgment, then the statute enables the
defendant to attempt to recover its attorney fees in an otherwise nonfee case.
In sum, attorneys should take caution when using section 1101.1 since it creates the
danger that either party could recover its attorney fees and litigation costs if the
opposing party rejects an offer and then fails to recover more than the offer at trial.
An attorney should also be certain to specify the section she is using when creating
an offer ofjudgment so that she does not accidentally invoke section 1101.1, creating
the danger presented above.
III. Offer of Judgment in Multiple-PlaintiffCases
In a world of complex litigation, attorneys should know how to manage cases with
multiple-plaintiffs. An essential step in managing complex litigation is making offers
of judgment. Oklahoma has not addressed the question of how to provide an offer of
judgment in a case with multiple plaintiffs. However, other jurisdictions with offer of
judgment statutes substantially similar to Oklahoma's have addressed the issue."7
From these cases, two problems develop: offers of judgment without apportionment
and offers of judgment with conditional acceptance.
A. Apportionment Versus Lump-Sum Offers
A majority of courts have held that if a defendant makes an offer of judgment to
multiple plaintiffs and does not apportion the settlement amount to each plaintiff, then
the defendant will not be entitled to costs."' Therefore, a defendant must specifically
state how much each plaintiff will receive from the offer. Collectively, the cases give
three reasons for requiring the defendant to apportion the settlement amount in
multiple plaintiff cases rather than use lump sum."9 First, courts need to be able to
easily compare the amount of the offer of judgment and the amount of the actual
judgment." Second, apportionment allows each plaintiff to independently evaluate
the offer.' Third, requiring apportionment allows each plaintiff to individually
accept or deny the offer of judgment.'" These issues are discussed in depth below.
1.Court's Comparison Difficulty
Taylor v. Clark"2 illustrates the court's difficulty in comparing the value of the
judgment received and the value of the offer made where more than one plaintiff is
involved. In Taylor, the court held that the offer of judgment statute did not apply to

117. Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 164 F.3d 1071, 1077 (7th Cir. 1999); Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718
P.2d 929 (Alaska 1986); Brinkerhoff v. Swearingen Aviation Corp., 663 P.2d 937, 943 (Alaska 1983);
Meissner v. Paulson, 260 Cal. Rptr. 826, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Hutchins v. Waters, 123 Cal. Rptr.
819, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Randles v. Lowry, 84 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Taylor
v. Clark, 883 P.2d 569, 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
118. Gavoni, 164 F.3d at 1076; Randles, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 321; Taylor, 883 P.2d at 571.
119. An offer that is not apportioned is often called a lump-sum offer or a joint offer.
120. Gavoni, 164 F.3d at 1076; Randles, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 321; Taylor, 883 P.2d at 571.
121. Gavoni, 164 F.3d at 1077; Taylor, 883 P.2d at 571.
122. Gavoni, 164 F.3d at 1077.
123. 883 P.2d 569 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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an offer of judgment made to two plaintiffs because the offer did not specifically
apportion the settlement amount for each plaintiff.Iu Therefore, the defendant could
not recover costs."
In Taylor, the two plaintiffs sued the defendant for personal injuries suffered during
an assault.'" The defendant offered to have a judgment entered against it for a lump
sum of $10,000." The plaintiffs rejected the offer." At trial, the first plaintiff
received a judgment against the defendant for $2500 and the second plaintiff received
a judgment against the defendant for $5000, for a total of $7500." The trial court
ruled that because the actual judgment ($7500) was less than the offer of judgment
($10,000), the court required the plaintiffs to pay the defendant's costs from the time
the defendant made the offer of judgment."
The plaintiffs appealed the decision, contending that Colorado's offer of judgment
statute did not apply because the offer was made to plaintiffs jointly and, therefore,
was invalid." The appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs and reversed the trial
court's ruling. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to costs because
it did not apportion the settlement amount to each plaintiff." The court stated that
lump-sum offers make it difficult for the court to determine whether the first plaintiff
or the second plaintiff received a less favorable judgment than the offer."
For example, the first plaintiff received a judgment of $2500." It is difficult for
the court to compare this amount to the offer of judgment lump sum of $10,000. The
defendant in offering the $10,000 could have intended for the first plaintiff to receive
$2000 and the second plaintiff to receive $8000. If this were the case, then the first
plaintiffs judgment would have been more favorable than defendant's offer. However,
the courts do not want to speculate as to defendants' intentions in making a lump-sum

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 571.

d.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id.
/d.

130. Id.
131. The Colorado offer of judgment statute in 1993 provided as follows:
At any time more than ten days before trial begins, a party defending against a claim
may serve upon the adverse party an offer of settlement to the effect specified in his offer,
with costs then accrued. If within ten days after service of the offer, the adverse party
serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the and notice
of acceptance and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment.... If the judgment finally

obtainedby the offeree is not morefavorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs
incurred after making of the offer.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-202(3) (1993) (emphasis added) (amended 1995). This statute is substantially
similar to title 12, section 17 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
132. Taylor, 883 P.2d at 570.
133. Id. at 571.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 570.
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offer. Thus, the rule emerged that the defendant must allocate a specific amount to
each plaintiff.
Other state courts have followed the reasoning set forth in Taylor. In Randles v.
Lowry,'37 the California Appeals Court held that joint offers made to all plaintiffs
"without designating how it should be divided between them," do not trigger the costshifting provision of the California offer of judgment statute.' The Randles court
stated that lump-sum offers to multiple plaintiffs make it impossible, not just difficult,
for a court to determine whether the first or the second plaintiff received a less
favorable judgment than the amount offered.
In Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., the Seventh Circuit agreed that courts need
easily comparable sums." ° The Seventh Circuit expanded the foregoing reasoning,
stating that difficult comparisons can lead to appeals.' For example, if a court uses
a lump-sum offer of judgment and decides that one plaintiffs verdict is less favorable
than the offer sum, then that plaintiff will likely appeal." 2 On appeal, the plaintiff
could contend that the trial court's determination was arbitrary and unfair. However,
if the offer is already apportioned, the court could easily make the "more or less
favorable" determination and avoid an appeal. 4 Therefore, requiring apportioned
offers of judgment could prevent derivative litigation.'"
2. Plaintiffs Comparison Difficulty
The lump-sum offer creates a similar difficulty for plaintiffs assessing the benefit
of the defendant's offer compared to the likely judgment. In Taylor, the court stated
that with a lump-sum offer, plaintiffs are not capable of "independently weighing the
benefit of accepting an unspecified portion of the offer against the likelihood of
receiving a less favorable judgment.""'4 The facts in Taylor are helpful in explaining
the second rationale for requiring apportionment. In Taylor, the defendant made a
lump-sum offer to the plaintiffs. When determining whether to accept the offer, the
second plaintiff may have used the following rationale: First, the second plaintiff

137. 84 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
138. Id. In 1970, the California offer of judgment statute provided as follows:
The defendant may, at any time before the trial or judgment, serve upon the plaintiff
an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the sum or property, or to the
effect therein specified. If the plaintiff accepts the offer, and give notice thereof with in
five days, he may file the offer, with proof of notice of acceptance, and the clerk, or the
judge where there is no clerk, must thereupon enter judgment accordingly. If the notice
of acceptance be not given, the offer is to be deemed withdrawn, and cannot be given in
evidence upon the trial; and ifthe plaintifffail to obtain a more favorablejudgment, he
cannot recover costs, but must pay the defendant's costs from the time of the offer.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 997 (West 1992) (emphasis added) (repealed 2000).
139. 164 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 1999).
140. Id. at 1077.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Taylor v. Clark, 883 P.2d 569, 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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would project the amount it expected to receive at trial, for example $7500. Next, the
second plaintiff would look at the lump-sum offer of $10,000 and assume that it
would have to split the amount evenly with the first plaintiff, thereby receiving $5000
each. The second plaintiff would likely reject this lump-sum offer of judgment
because it believes it would receive more at trial. However, the defendant may have
intended that the second plaintiff receive $8000, rather than the $5000 assumed. In
that case, the offer would be higher in value than the value the second plaintiff
expected. Therefore, if the defendant would have apportioned the offer of judgment,
then the second plaintiff would have accepted the offer of judgment for $8000.
By making a lump-sum offer, the defendant was assured that the plaintiffs would
reject the offer and defendant would likely be entitled to costs. Anticipating that
defense attorneys had developed a trap that raised the possibility of recovering costs,
the courts reacted quickly and ended the trap by requiring the defendant to apportion
its offer."
3. Plaintiffs' Independent Acceptance
In 1999, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the question of whether defendants may
make joint offers of judgment to multiple plaintiffs. Like the state cases that had
addressed the issue, the Seventh Circuit answered in the negative. In Gavoni v.
Dobbs, 7 the court stated that requiring a defendant to apportion its offer of
judgment amount to each plaintiff promotes settling civil litigation." The court
reasoned that each agreement made will stimulate further negotiations with nonsettling
plaintiffs because as each plaintiff accepts, the share of post-offer costs becomes
greater for the nonsettling plaintiffs. 49 Thus, the apportionment requirement furthers
the purpose of the statute, which is to promote settlement of civil litigation.'"
In Gavoni, three plaintiffs sued the defendant for personal injuries. The defendant
made a joint offer of judgment to the plaintiffs for $10,000 "to be divided among all
three plaintiffs, with costs then accrued."'' The plaintiffs rejected the offer." At
trial, the jury awarded the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff $2000 each." The
jury awarded the third plaintiff $2500." The total damages awarded to all plaintiffs
was $6500. 55
The defendant moved for costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 682'

146. Gavoni, 164 F.3d at 1076; Randles v. Lowry, 84 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970);
Taylor, 883 P.2d at 571.
147. 164 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 1999).
148. Id. at 1077.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1074.
152. Id.

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Offers of judgment in federal court are governed by FED. R. CIv. P. 68, which provides:
begins, a party defending against a
At any time more than 10 days before the trial
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against
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The trial court denied the motion.l" The defendant appealed the trial courts decision
contending that the total amount that the plaintiffs received ($6500) was less than the
unapportioned amount offered ($10,000); thus triggering the cost-shifting provision of
rule 68." The appeals court disagreed, finding that the defendant must make
apportioned offers of judgment.'59 The court stated that requiring apportioned offers
would promote individual acceptance."
Using the facts of Gavoni to create an example makes the court's reasoning more
clear. When a defendant initially makes an offer of judgment, each plaintiff estimates
the risk involved as one-third of the defendant's post-offer costs. If one plaintiff
accepts the offer, then the risk for the other two plaintiffs becomes one-half of the
defendant's post-offer costs. Therefore, as each plaintiff accepts the offer, the stakes
rise for the remaining plaintiffs, thereby encouraging them to settle as well so that they
do not face the possibility of paying for 100% of the defendant's costs. Therefore,
requiring apportioned offers of judgment promotes the settlement of civil litigation.
B. ConditionalSettlements
Courts have also held that if the settlement is conditioned on all plaintiffs accepting,
then the offer of judgment is void. In Hutchins v. Waters,'6' the California Court of
Appeals reasoned that it "is in public interest that the offer of judgment give each
[plaintiff] the opportunity to accept and consummate the offer made [to] him." 6
Therefore, the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to costs because the offer
of judgment contained a conditional acceptance provision."
The court found that in offering a judgment, the defendant must make an
unconditional settlement?. Offers of judgment that require conditional acceptance
do not indicate the defendant's willingness to accept.- Instead, conditional acceptance
offers indicate that the defendant is attempting to create a trap, similar to the trap used
by defense attorneys explained above. Namely, the defendant is abusing the offer of

the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with
costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer of notice of
acceptance together with proof of service thereof then thereupon the clerk shall enter
judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not
admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgmentfinally obtained by
the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer. (emphasis added).
Id. This federal statute is substantially similar to an Oklahoma offer of judgment statute. CompareFED.
R. Civ. P. 68 with 12 OKLA STAT. § 1101 (Supp. 1999).
157. Gavoni, 164 F.3d at 1074.
158. Id. at 1074, 1077.
159. Id. at 1077.
160. Id.
161. 123 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
162. Id. at 822.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 821.
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judgment procedure in order to receive costs that normally would not be available to
it. Thus, the rule emerges that the court will not allow conditional offers of judgment.
The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the holding from Gavoni in Hayes v. Xerox
Corp." The court stated that requiring plaintiffs to conditionally accept is an unjust
requirement. Articulately, the court said that "one plaintiff might think his or her offer
is fair while the other may not and it would not only be unfair to require joint
acceptance but [it] would also frustrate the chances of settlement which is the purpose
behind" offer of judgment statutes."
In Meisner v. Paulson,67 a California appellate court held that "only an offer made
to a single plaintiff, without need for allocation or acceptance by other plaintiffs,
qualifies as a valid offer.'
This holding conflicts with other California cases,
which state that a defendant can make a joint offer of judgment if the amount is
apportioned for each plaintiff."6
The distinction between this holding and the majority view is not obvious.
However, the distinction is important. The court in Meisner required the defendant to
write an offer of judgment to each plaintiff on separate pieces of paper.t" The
majority of the cases state that the defendant can make offers of judgment on one
piece of paper addressed to all the plaintiffs as long as the offer apportions the amount
to each plaintiff and does not require conditional acceptance.'' The Meisner court
takes the requirement one step further than the majority, eliminating the need for the
apportionment and individual acceptance rules by not allowing the defendant to make
an offer of judgment to multiple plaintiffs in one document." Attorneys must note
that the courts may eventually follow Meisner.
C. Application
If Oklahoma follows the case law set forth," then two rules emerge for Oklahoma lawyers making offers of judgment in multiple-plaintiff cases. First, making
an offer to each plaintiff individually is the safest way to avoid denial of the
defendant's costs if the plaintiffs reject the offer of judgment. In the alternative, a
lawyer may make a joint offer of judgment to all the plaintiffs as long as the
defendant apportions the settlement amount to each plaintiff individually. Second,
lawyers should not include statements of conditional acceptance in the offer of
judgment. If a lawyer elects to include statements of conditional acceptance, she runs
the risk of the court denying the defendant's motion for costs.

165. 718 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1986).
166. Id.at 937. The Court was applying FED. R. Civ. P. 68 to the case. FED. R. CIv. P. 68 is
virtually identical to title 12, section 1101 of the Oklahoma Statutes. See supra note 156.
167. 260 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
168. l at 829.
169. Randles v. Lowry, 84 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
170. Meisner, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
171. Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 164 F.3d 1071, 1076 (7th Cir. 1999); Randles, 84 Cal. Rptr. at
325; Taylor v. Clark, 883 P.2d 569, 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
172. Meisner, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
173. Whether Oklahoma will adopt the case law is discussed in depth in Part IV of this comment.
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IV. Offer of Judgment in Multiple-Defendant Cases
Oklahoma courts have not addressed the issue of how to make an offer ofjudgment
in cases involving more than one defendant. However, one federal case and at least
three state courts have addressed the question.'" Whether it is better to make an
offer of judgment individually or jointly with the other co-defendants depends
primarily on whether the defendants in the case are jointly and severally liable.
Therefore, this article analyzes how Oklahoma attorneys should make an offer of
judgment under these terms. This section addresses three problems. The first problem
deals with the situation in which the defendants are jointly and severally liable. The
second problem arises where the defendants are severally liable. The third problem
arising in offers of judgment with multiple defendants involves settlements between
one of the defendants and the plaintiff. The fourth section, then, analyzes the case law
presented in sections A through C and presents suggestions on how lawyers should
create offers of judgment in multiple defendant cases.
A. Defendants Who Are Jointly and Severally Liable
In cases where the defendants are jointly and severally liable, each defendant is
responsible for the entire amount of the judgment entered against it."' Thus, courts
have held that defendants either should make a joint offer for the entire amount, or if
only one defendant makes an offer of judgment, that defendant should make the offer
for a sufficient amount to cover all of the damages.
Gilbert v. City of Caldwell" is a case involving jointly and severally liable
defendants who made an offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68.'" In Gilbert, the first defendant made an offer of judgment for $7500
and the second defendant made an offer of judgment for $2500, jointly delivered to
the plaintiffs counsel." The plaintiff rejected both offers." Following trial, the
first defendant was found liable individually for $4989 in damages." Both
defendants were found jointly and severally liable for $2000 in damages."' The trial
court awarded the plaintiff $874 in pre-offer costs. Thus, the first defendant was liable
either individually or jointly, for the entire amount of the $7863 damages award."
The plaintiff claimed it was entitled to recover its post-offer costs because the first
defendant was adjudged liable for an amount slightly greater than its individual offer

174. Johnston v. Penrod Drilling Co., 803 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1986); Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 732
P.2d 355 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Denil v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986);
Thornburg v. PurseIl, 476 So. 2d 323 (Fla. App. 1985).
175. RESTATEMENT CTHIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 10 (2000).
176. 732 P.2d 355 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
178. Gilbert,732 P.2d at 367.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. IL
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of $7500." The first defendant countered that if the plaintiff had accepted both
offers, it would have been in a more favorable position than it ultimately was.'"
The court agreed with the plaintiff, reasoning that each defendant could rely only
on its own offer of judgment and that a defendant should not be allowed to rely on
the offers of the other defendants." The court further reasoned that interpreting the
statute this way would "forward the rule's policy of encouraging fair and reasonable
settlement offers by each party."" The court held that the offer of judgment rule
should be read to test the offer and the recovery from each party independently and
"[o]nly if its own offer exceeded its individual liability can the particular defendant
be said to have made a fair offer.""' Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to recover
post-offer costs because the first defendant was held liable for more than the $7500
it offered and, thus, the plaintiffs "position after trial was more favorable than if [the
first defendant's] offer had been accepted.""'
In a footnote, the court pointed out that its result would have been different in a
case where the defendants expressly made a joint offer." The effect of the
defendants' drafting the offer of judgment collectively would have made the total
amount of the offer $9000. The plaintiffs judgment only amounted to $7863; thus, the
judgment would have been less favorable to the plaintiff. With such facts, the court
indicated that it would have allowed defendant to recover because it could have easily
compared the collective offer with the judgments rendered.
Under a similar set of facts, the Florida Court of Appeals agreed with the Gilbert
court. In Thornburg v. Pursell,"'the court held that it would be inequitable to allow
the trial court to treat offers collectively for the purpose of awarding or denying
costs.' 9' In Thornburg, the plaintiffs brought a personal injury action against several
defendants." One defendant made an offer of judgment for $1500 in 1982 and the
other defendants made an offer of judgment for $500 in 1981." The plaintiffs
rejected the offers."' Upon trial, the jury awarded plaintiffs $2000 in damages"
Plaintiffs filed a motion to tax costs against the defendants." Using the Florida offer
of judgment statute," the court denied plaintiffs' motion on the ground that the

183. Id. at 368.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 368 n.l.
190. 476 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
191. IkL at 325.
192. IM. at 324.
193. Id. at 324-25.
194. Id. at 325.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 is virtually identical to title 12, section 1101 of the
Oklahoma Statutes. The Florida rule provides in pertinent part as follows:
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plaintiffs' recovery was not more favorable than the defendants' collective offers of
judgment, totaling $9000.'
On appeal, the court reversed, finding that the two offers of judgment could not be
aggregated. Therefore, the judgment rendered to the plaintiffs was more than either
of the offers of judgment." The court pointed out that the plaintiffs did not have
the opportunity to consider offers collectively because they were made at different
times and because the statute mandated that each offer of judgment was ivithdrawn
if not accepted within ten days.' Since all the defendants, save one, made an offer
in 1981 and one defendant made its offer in 1982, it was impossible for the plaintiffs
to consider the offers made together because the earlier offer had expired before the
later offer was made. z
The court stated:
The effect of an offer of settlement is determined by its precise terms as
formulated by the offeror. The offers in this case were not made
simultaneously, and neither offer indicated it was to be joined with the
other ... We note that, had either of the offers equaled $2,000, the
amount of the judgment finally obtained, the offeror would have been
entitled to recover costs.'
Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to costs because it would
not add the amounts of the two offers and compare the aggregate sum to the judgment
rendered.'
B. Defendants Who Are Severally Liable
In cases where the defendants are severally liable, each defendant is responsible for
only its share of the damages. In this situation, courts have held that the defendants
must make separate offers. The analysis of this issue set forth in Denil v. Integrity
Mutual Insurance Co.' is very useful.
In Denil, the plaintiff brought suit against four defendants for personal injuries
incurred in a car accident.' The four defendants made a joint offer of judgment of
$2500.' The plaintiff rejected the offer.' At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff
An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence of it is not admissible
except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgmentfnally obtained by the adverse
party is not more favorable than the offer, the must pay the costs incurredafter the
making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §1.442 (West 1985) (emphasis added). The last sentence is different from title 12,
section 1101 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
198. Thornburg,476 So. 2d at 325.
199. lId at 324.
200. Id at 325.
201. Id.
202. i& at 325 (citations omitted).

203. Id.
204. 401 N.W.2d 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
205. id. at 14.

206. Id.
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$1960.85 in damages.' The trial court granted the defendants their costs because
the defendants' joint offer of judgment exceeded the plaintiffs damage award.'
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in granting the
defendants their costs, asserting that a joint offer of judgment by multiple defendants
is ineffective to invoke the cost-shifting under the offer of judgment statute.21 The
court held that defendants who are jointly and severally liable may make joint offers,
but defendants who are severally liable must make separate offers."' The court
reasoned that if it were to allow defendants who are severally liable to make joint
offers, the statute's purpose would be defeated in the same way as would joint offers
to multiple plaintiffs."' "When presented with such an offer, a plaintiff is denied an
opportunity to separately evaluate each defendant's offer of admitted liability and to
settle the plaintiffs claim with that defendant." '
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment because the defendants were found to
be jointly and severally liable! 4 Thus, their joint offer was valid and within the
purview of the offer of judgment statute 15 However, under the court's reasoning the
outcome would have been different if the defendants had been severally liable. The
court indicated that if the trial court had found the defendants severally liable, then the
joint offer would not have been valid. Therefore, the severally liable defendants would
not have been entitled to post-offer costs.
C. One Defendant Settles
What happens to the offer of judgment amount when a plaintiff rejects an offer
made by multiple defendants and subsequently settles with one of the defendants? Not
many courts have addressed this problem, though the Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue
in Johnston v. PenrodDrilling Co..2"6
In Johnston, the plaintiff sued two defendants for personal injuries.217 Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,18 the defendants made an unapportioned joint
offer of judgment for $7500. "19 Plaintiff rejected the offer.' Plaintiff later settled
with the first defendant for $3500 and proceeded to trial solely against the second

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
803 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 869.
FED.R. Civ. P. 68.
Johnston, 803 F.2d. at 869.
Id.
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defendant."' After trial, the jury awarded plaintiff damages of $6526.80 and all costs
of the proceedings.'
The second defendant moved to amend the judgment, contending that the plaintiff
was not entitled to costs because he declined defendants' offer of judgment.' In
response, the plaintiff argued that if Rule 68 applies, then the amount received in
judgment should include the $3500 he received in settlement from the first defendant
because that was the "true measure of recovery."'m So plaintiff argued that the court
should add $6526.80 and $3500 and compare the total ($10,026.80) to the offer of
judgment amount ($7500). The second defendant argued that the court should not
consider the settlement received from a third party because the rule only addresses
sums received by judgment.' The second defendant was arguing that the court
should only compare the $6526.80 to the $7500. The district court agreed with the
second defendant and modified its judgment to assess costs against the plaintiff.'
On appeal by the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.' The
court said that Rule 68 applies to joint offers of judgment made to a plaintiff by a
number of defendants.m However, the rule did not apply where the plaintiff settled
with one of the defendants because the offer of judgment no longer represented the
amount for all the defendants. ' The court stated that it would not add or subtract
for the benefit of the plaintiff or the defendant. m Rather it would be better for the
remaining defendants to make a new offer of judgment once one of the defendants
settled out." In its reasoning, the court again reinforced the purpose of promoting
settlement.'
D. Analysis
1. Joint and Several Rule
The courts' holdings in Gilbert v. City of Caldwell 3 and Thornburg v. Pursell
reflect the danger of defendants making individual offers of judgment where their
liability is joint and several. Thus, lawyers who are creating offers of judgment in
multiple-defendant cases should consider the following two rules.
First, multiple defendants should try to make a joint offer of judgment for the full
amount of the damages. For example, a plaintiff sues three defendants. If the

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 870.
Id.
1&
Id.
hi
Id.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id.
732 P.2d 355 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
476 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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defendants are certain that they will be found jointly and severally liable and that an
offer of judgment for $10,000 will likely be lower than the actual judgment amount,
then the defendants, collectively, should make an offer of judgment for the entire
$10,000.
Second, if one defendant must make an individual offer of judgment, but his codefendants refuse to join in the offer, then the offer amount would have to exceed the
entire judgment ultimately obtained by the plaintiffs - not simply the single
defendant's proportionate share of the ultimate judgment. Therefore, in the example
above if plaintiff recovered $10,000 jointly and severally from the defendants, then an
individual offer of judgment would have to be over $10,000. The defendant who
made the individual offer of judgment would only recover post-offer costs if his offer
of judgment was for more than the total judgment amount.
What if the plaintiff accepted the offer made by a single defendant who is jointly
and severally liable with others? In this situation, the individual defendant would be
liable for the entire amount. But, if the defendant proceeded to trial with the rest of
the defendants, he may not have to pay the amount alone." The individual
defendant may be entitled to contribution from the offer of judgment, but this is not
likely. However, if the defendant proceeds to trial with the other defendants and
subsequently becomes responsible for the entire amount, the defendant cannot sue the
other defendants for contribution.'
2. Severally Liable Rule
The court's holding in Denil v. Integrity Mutual Insurance 7 indicates that lawyers
should treat cases with severally liable defendants differently than cases with jointly
and severally liable plaintiffs. In cases with severally liable defendants, each defendant
should make individual offers ofjudgment for its calculated share of the damages. For
example, if the plaintiff sues three defendants for $10,000 and the defendants are
severally liable, then each defendant should make an offer of judgment for an
individual amount. The first, second, and third defendants could offer $5000, $4000,
and $9000 respectably. If the plaintiff rejects the offers, then at trial the amount
designated for each defendant will be easily comparable. If the plaintiff receives a
judgment of $3000 against the first defendant, the court will immediately know that
the first defendant is entitled to costs because the actual judgment ($3000) is less than
the offer of judgment ($5000).
3. Settlement of One Defendant
The rule in Johnston v. Penrod Drilling Co.' indicates that if one defendant
settles after multiple-defendants make a joint offer of judgment, then the remaining

235. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832 (Supp. 1995). Contribution among joint tortfeasors is beyond the scope
of this article.
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 23 (2000).

237. 401 N.W.2d 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
238. 803 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1986).
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nonsettling defendants should make a new offer of judgment 9 For example, a
plaintiff sues three defendants and all three make a joint offer of judgment for
$10,000. The plaintiff rejects the offer. Before the trial, the first defendant privately
settles with the plaintiff for $2000. At trial, the plaintiff recovers $9000 against the
second and third defendants. The second and third defendants move for costs pursuant
to section 1101 because the judgment ($7000) is less than the offer of judgment
($10,000). The court will deny the defendants' motion for costs because the joint offer
is no longer applicable because when one defendant privately settles, the offer of
judgment no longer represents a true offer by all the defendants together.
To avoid the inapplicability of the statute due to one defendant privately settling,
the remaining defendants should make a new offer of judgment, subtracting the
amount that they consider to be the first defendant's portion. For example, the second
and third defendants could have made a new offer of judgment for $8000 (the original
offer of judgment amount of $10,000 minus the first defendant's settlement price of
$2000). If the second and third defendant would have taken this step, then they would
be entitled to costs because the judgment rendered ($7000) was less than the second
amount offered ($8000).
V. Analysis
Oklahoma will likely follow the reasoning and rules promulgated by the cases
above for two reasons. First, all the statutes discussed are virtually identical to
Oklahoma's offer of judgment statute. Second, in Dulan v. Johnston,"° the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma stated that the recognized purpose of Oklahoma's offer of
judgment statute is to promote settlement in civil litigation. This is the same as the
other states' purposes for enacting the offer of judgment statutes. The cases above
all begin with the premise that the purpose of offers of judgment is to promote
settlement. When Oklahoma addresses the issue, it will be starting with the same
premise. Therefore, the Oklahoma Supreme Court will likely adhere to the reasoning
promulgated by the courts above.
Oklahoma courts should adopt concrete rules as have other jurisdictions for five
reasons. First, and most importantly, it will further the purpose of the statute in
promoting settlement of civil litigation. Second, the rules will reduce the inherent
ambiguity present in the statutory language. Third, the rules will help prevent
derivative litigation. Fourth, the court will be allowing each individual plaintiff or
defendant to make easy comparisons and independent acceptance. Fifth, setting rules
to govem the procedure of the offer of judgment statutes -will encourage beneficial use
of the statutes.
VI. Conclusion
Ultimately, an attorney should know how to address three common trouble areas
in the offer of judgment procedure. First, an attorney should know which statute to use

239. Id. at 871.
240. 687 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Okla. 1984).
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for her offer of judgment Oklahoma attorneys should use section 1101 in an action
for the recovery of money only. A lawyer should use section 940 for actions to
recover damages for the negligent or willful injury to property and any other incidental
costs related to such action. The statute only applies to claims for physical injury to
tangible property. An attorney should use section 1106 any time that she would use
section 1101, but in the situation where the defendant does not want to make an offer
of judgment for the entire amount of damages or all actions brought against it.
A lawyer may use section 1101.1 in two situations. First, section 1101.1 can be
used for any action for the recovery for personal injury, wrongful death,
discrimination, and retaliatory discharge when the plaintiff seeks monetary damages
in excess of $100,000 or the offer of judgment is for $100,000 or more. Second, an
attorney can use section 1101.1 for any civil action "brought for the recovery of
money or property in an action other than" personal injury, wrongful death,
discrimination and retaliatory discharge." However, due to the additional risks
created by the new statute, the attorney should carefully consider whether using
section 1101.1 rather than section 1101 is in her client's best interest.
The second practice tip an attorney should glean from this comment comes when
making an offer of judgment in a multiple-plaintiff case. Making an offer to each
plaintiff individually is the safest way to avoid denial of defendant's costs after the
plaintiffs reject an offer ofjudgment. In the alternative, a defendant may make a joint
offer of judgment to all the plaintiffs as long as the defendant apportions the
settlement amount to each plaintiff individually. Another rule is that defendants should
not include statements in the offer of judgment that condition the triggering of the
cost-shifting provision on the acceptance by both plaintiffs. If a defendant elects to
include statements of conditional acceptance, it runs the risk of the court denying the
defendant's motion for costs.
Third, an attorney should know how to make an offer of judgment in cases with
multiple defendants, or at least know the likely consequences of making joint or
separate offers of judgment in tort liability cases. In cases where the defendants are
jointly and severally liable, multiple defendants should try to make a joint offer of
judgment for the full amount of the damages. If one defendant must make an
individual offer of judgment, then the amount offered needs to exceed the judgment
ultimately obtained by the plaintiffs - not simply the single defendant's proportionate
share of the ultimate judgment. In cases with severally liable defendants, each
defendant should make individual offers of judgment for its calculated share of the
damages. Attorneys should not include statements of conditional acceptance in joint
offers of judgment made by multiple defendants.
Leah Marie Thomas

241. 12 OKLA. STAT.§ 1101.1 (1991 & Supp. 1999).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss1/13

